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CONSENT DECREES IN PRISON AND
JAIL REFORM-RELAXED STANDARD
OF REVIEW FOR GOVERNMENT
MOTIONS TO MODIFY
CONSENT DECREES
Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748

(1992)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail,I the United States
Supreme Court held that a flexible standard of review should apply
to requests to modify consent decrees stemming from institutional
reform litigation.2 In doing so, it rejected the use of the "grievous
wrong" standard set forth in United States v. Swift & Co. 3 Under the
Rufo Court's flexible standard, "a party seeking modification of a
consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or
law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance." '4 The Court
noted that in addition to the effects of the decree on the parties
themselves, the effects of the decree on third parties and the public
interest should be taken into account when determining whether or
not a change in fact warrants a modification of the decree.5 The
Court also held that if a change in fact or law warrants a modification of a consent decree, the district courts should show great deference to the plans submitted by government officials for
implementing such modifications. 6
This Note examines the development of consent decree review
standards from the Swift "grievous wrong" standard first enunciated
in antitrust litigation, to the dual standards that now apply in public
and private law litigation. This Note asserts that the relaxed Rufo
standard correctly recognizes the need for flexibility in administer1
2
3
4
5
6

112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
Id. at 764-65.
286 U.S. 106 (1932).
Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 765.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 764.
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ing consent decrees involving the reform of public institutions. This
Note also argues that the deferential standard for reviewing proposed modifications effectively reduces the intrusive presence of the
courts in the administration of public institutions while insuring that
consent decrees remain viable tools for the settlement of institutional reform cases.
II.

BACKGROUND

The consent decree is a hybrid of a contract and an injunction.
Two litigating parties fashion a prospective remedy and then request the court to enter judgment based on that agreement. As it
would in the case of an injunction, the court then monitors the
agreement to ensure that the parties-comply with its terms. 7 The
consent decree offers the parties three benefits over the pursuit of
litigation: first, the parties save the costs of a court battle; second,
the parties avoid the uncertainties of a trial; and third, the parties
retain control over the creation of the remedial plan.8 However, as
is the case with any ongoing relationship, the ability of the parties to
foresee all possible changes in circumstances is limited. Changes in
fact or law may occur that partially or substantially frustrate the
original purposes of the agreement. 9
In instances where changes in fact or law occur, the nature of
the consent decree as a judgment comes into play. The federal
courts, bound by the equitable principles embodied in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), must upon motion by one of the parties
terminate or modify a consent decree if "it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application." 10 Given
the wide range of discretion historically associated with equitable
jurisprudence, the rope that binds the courts to a duty to modify the
consent decree is tied loosely. As a result, courts have varied widely
in their interpretations of what constitutes a change in circumstances significant enough to require a modification of the original
injunction.
7 Maimon Schwarzschild, PublicLaw by PrivateBargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the
Fairnessof Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE LJ. 887, 894.
8 Id. at 899.
9 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in
the Federal Courts, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1101, 1102 (1986).
10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
party's legal representative from a final judgement, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:

...(5)

the judgement has been satisfied, released, or discharged,

or a priorjudgement upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgement should have prospective application.
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AND ANTITRUST LITIGATION

The Supreme Court set forth the general principles regarding
the modification of consent decrees in United States v. Swift & Co. "
Decided in 1932, Swift involved a request for a modification of a
consent decree between the federal government and the five largest
meat packing companies in the country. 12 The consent decree was
originally entered as a settlement of a case under the Sherman Antitrust Act' 3 to break up the oligopoly structure of the meat-packing
industry. 14 In 1930, ten years after the initial decree, Swift & Co.
and Armour & Co. requested that the provision banning investment
in related industries be modified to allow the two packers to engage
in most of the activities prohibited by the decree. 15 They claimed
that the food industry "had been transformed so completely that
6
restraints of the injunction... were now useless and oppressive."'
The lower courts allowed the modification of the consent decree,
but the Supreme Court overturned the ruling, denying the request
17
for modification.
Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo set forth what has become the basic standard for evaluating requests for modification of
consent decrees:
No doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction is relaxed,
but they are not suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to
justify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression. Nothing
less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was
decreed after
8
years of litigation with the consent of all concerned.'
Taken on its own, this language suggests that a party seeking a modification must meet a high burden of proof in order to receive relief.
The references to extreme and unexpected hardship, and the requirement of a "clear showing of a grievous wrong," suggest that
11 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
12 Id. at 110.
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
14 Swift, 286 U.S. at 110. The five largest packers, Swift & Co., Armour & Co., Wilson
& Co., Morris Packing Co., and Cudahy Packing Co., effectively controlled the meat
packing industry and together moved to control "substitute foods" by controlling
wholesale and retail food distribution.
15 Id. at 113. The provisions of the decree included stipulations banning the five
companies from engaging in or holding interests in public stockyard companies, railroads, market newspapers, and cold storage facilities, as well as "manufacturing, selling
or transporting any of 114 enumerated food products." Id. at 111.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 120.
18 Id. at 119.
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Cardozo supported an impossibility of performance 1 9 approach to
20
the problem, which many lower courts have continued to follow.
Yet, earlier in the opinion, Cardozo specifically stated, "We reject
the argument for the interveners that a decree entered upon consent is to be treated as a contract and not a judicial act," and "a
court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate if
satisfied that what it has been doing has been turned through chang21
ing circumstances into an instrument of wrong."
The strong assertion of the courts' right to modify consent decrees seems at odds with the shackles Justice Cardozo later put on
their ability to exercise that power. A number of courts, including
the Supreme Court in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,22
have attempted to explain this dichotomy by noting that in Swift,
conditions had not changed enough to prevent the meat-packers
from exerting monopoly power in the businesses from which they
were banned. 23 In United Shoe Machinery Corp., the Court stated that
19 The impossibility of performance doctrine in classical contract law requires that a
change in law or fact actually make the performance of the contract terms impossible
before the parties will be released from their responsibilities under the contract. As Williston states, "The fact that by supervening circumstances, performance of a promise is
made more difficult and expensive, or the counter-performance of less value than the
parties anticipated when the contract was made, will ordinarily not excuse the promisor
[from performance]." 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1963 (3d ed. 1978).
20 See, e.g., Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(grievous wrong standard applied in jail reform case); Fortin v. Comm'r of Mass. Dep't
of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1982) (denial of motion by welfare department
to modify consent decree regarding welfare eligibility determinations); Coalition of
Black Leadership v. Cianci, 480 F. Supp. 1340 (D.R.I. 1979) (grievous wrong standard
applied to a request for modification of consent decree in police brutality case); Fox v.
United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 680 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1982) (inability of
plaintiffs to procure private mortgage financing not sufficient change in fact to require
change in consent decree to force HUD to increase low income rental subsidies); Ruiz v.
Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987) (district court correct in applying grievous wrong
standard to government request for modification of consent decree in prison reform
case). See also Roberts v. St. Regis Paper Co., 653 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Western Electric Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. MCI Communications Corp. v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 283 (1990); SEC v. Advance Growth Capital
Corp., 539 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1976); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Am. Oil Co., 405 F.2d
803 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969).
21 Swift, 286 U.S. at 114-15.
22 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
23 Id. at 259. See Badgley v. Santacroce, 853 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988) (flexible standard
applied but modification of consent decree not allowed); United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (application of grievous wrong standard
by district court in request for modification of police promotion quotas incorrect); Keith
v. Volpe, 784 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986) (grievous wrong standard inappropriate when
one party moves to have an open term in the consent decree defined); Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1520 (1 th Cir. 1984) ("A consent decree includes the supervision
of changing conduct or conditions and is therefore provisional, modification may be
more freely granted."). See also King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418
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"Swift teaches that a decree may be changed upon an appropriate
showing, and it holds that it may not be changed in the interests of
the defendants if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in
the decree ...

'24
have not been fully achieved."

United Shoe Machinery Corp., like Swift, involved a government action under the Sherman Act to break United Shoe's monopoly in the
manufacturing of shoe machinery. 25 While the government originally sought to have the company dissolved, the district court instead entered an injunction placing restrictions on United Shoe's
operations. Despite these measures, United Shoe continued to
dominate its market and the government moved for a modification
of the earlier decree to break the company into two competitive entities.2 6 The district court denied this request, noting that the government had not met its burden under the Swift standard and that
the decree "had put in motion forces which . . . have eroded

United's power." 2 7 The Supreme Court vacated the district court's
decision, stating that "[t]he District Court misconceived the thrust
of this Court's decision in Swift." '28 The Court felt that the purpose

of the United Shoe decree was to try intermediate measures to eliminate the problem before moving to the more extreme measures requested by the government, and that the general purpose of ending
29
United Shoe's dominance of the market was not being advanced.
Given the nature of the issue and the language in the opinion, it
is not surprising that United Shoe Machinery Corp. has lent itself to a
variety of interpretations. Some courts and commentators have interpreted the decision to be a renunciation of the inflexible Swift
standard.3 0 Others, adhering to a more contractual view of the consent decree, note that United Shoe Machinery Corp. involved a decree
entered after litigation and as such does not apply to consent
31
decrees.
F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1969); Heath v. DeCourcy, 888 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1989); Plyler v.
Evatt, 846 F.2d 208, 212 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 897 (1988); Nelson v. Collins,
659 F.2d 420, 424 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
24 United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. at 248.
25 Id. at 245.
26 Id. at 247.
27 Id. (quoting United Shoe Machinery Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328, 334 (D. Mass., 1967)).
28 Id. at 248.
29 Id. at 252.
30 See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir
1969); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984)
(rehearing en banc); see generally Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional
Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020 (1986).
31 See, e.g., Fox v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 680 F.2d 315, 323
(3d Cir. 1982) (stating that United Shoe Machinery Corp. was "clearly inapposite" because
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Those courts adhering to a contractual view of consent decree
32
look to the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Armour & Co.
for support. Armour involved a request by the United States as the
plaintiff to modify the 1931 consent decree entered by the court in
Swift33 to prevent Greyhound Corp. from acquiring Armour. 3 4 The
government argued that because Greyhound held controlling interests in two grocery firms. the addition of Armour would allow Armour to assert the anti-competitive power the original decree was
designed to prevent.3 5 Justice Marshall's opinion suggests a contractual interpretation of consent decrees:
Thus the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the
parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve. For
these reasons, the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within
its four corners,
and not by reference to what might satisfy one of the
36
parties to it.
An explanation for this rather technical and narrow reading of the
purposes of the decree could be that the Supreme Court, recognizing the inapplicability of a fifty-one-year-old decree, wanted to release Armour from its obligations. The language though, remains as
37
support for a rigid reading of the Swift decision.
Whereas Swift, United Shoe Machinery Corp., and Armour concerned modification requests based on changes in fact, System Federation No. 91 v. Wright dealt with a modification request based on a
change in law. 38 System Federation involved a 1945 consent decree
between the railway workers union and non-union railway workers.
"there was an explicit prior adjucation that the defendant had monopolized the relevant
market in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act"). See also Rajender v. Univ. of Minnesota,
730 F.2d 1110, 1115 (8th Cir. 1984).
32

402 U.S. 673 (1971).

See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
Armour, 402 U.S. at 685. In 1969, the federal government entered a request to
modify a consent decree prohibiting Armour from engaging in the grocery business to
include General Host Corp., a company involved in food manufacture and sales, and
thereby prohibit General Host from purchasing Armour. General Host was then acquired by Greyhound Corp., which in turn acquired a controlling interest in Armour,
precipitating the government's request for a modification of the consent decree, which
forms the basis for the case at hand. Id. at 674.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 681-82 (footnote omitted).
37 See also Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (the
Supreme Court combined a "four corners" textual interpretation of a consent decree
between minority firefighters and the City of Memphis with a policy argument based on
the need to respect the interests of innocent third parties (white firefighters) to deny a
request for a modification of a consent decree).
38 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
33
34
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The decree settled a lawsuit brought by the non-union workers
under the Railway Labor Act by mandating an open shop in conformity with the Act. 3 9 In 1957, the Railway Labor Act was
amended to permit closed union shops and the railway workers
union moved to limit the prospective application of the consent decree. 40 The Supreme Court, reversing the lower court decision,
found that the union's acquiescence to the consent decree resulted
from the illegality of the closed union shop, and therefore the
change in law was a sufficient circumstantial change to require a
41
modification of the decree.
B.

THE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM EXPLOSION

The emergence of institutional reform litigation in the 1960s
added to the general confusion regarding the review of motions to
modify consent decrees. Since Brown v. Board of Education,42 the
number of cases alleging violations of statutory or constitutional
rights by public institutions has steadily increased. 43 While the nature of the rights violated and the type of remedy needed vary
greatly depending on the institution involved, all institutional reform cases present a number of problems which call for added flexibility in the implementation of consent decrees. First, because
institutional reform decrees involve a plan for the future operation
of the institution, as opposed to strict prohibitions on future activity
often seen in antitrust actions like Swift, many problems will only
appear after the plan is put into practice. 4 4 In addition the parties
face the problem of devising a plan which is equitable to all parties
involved, including third parties who inevitably will be affected by
changes to the institution. 4 5 Along these same lines, when the de39 Id. at 643. In an open shop, union membership cannot be a prerequisite to employment. While the union may represent the employees, it cannot prevent management
from employing laborers who are not members of the union. In a closed shop, union
membership is a prerequisite to employment in positions represented by the union.
40 Id. at 644-45.
41 Id.
42 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
43 See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984) (development of toxic waste discharge regulations); New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 915 (1983) (regulation of public mental health facilities); Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 161 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980) (discriminatory
zoning laws reformed); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007
(7th Cir. 1984) (rehearing en banc) (reform of FBI investigation procedures which infringed on right to free speech).
44 The iodification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, supra note 30, at
1020.
45 Id.
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cree affects the public institution, it also affects the right of the general public to control the operation of its institutions. 4 6 The courts'
role in devising and implementing consent decrees in institutional
reform cases creates separation of powers concerns. 4 7 Finally, by
requiring courts to monitor the operation of the institution over a
long period of time, the institutional reform cases increase the ad48
ministrative burden on courts.
The circuit courts began to recognize the special characteristics
of institutional reform decrees and some modified their standards of
review accordingly. In PhiladelphiaWelfare Rights Org. v. Shapp,4 9 the

Third Circuit affirmed a district court decision to modify a consent
decree involving the number of health screenings to be performed
by the defendants as part of their Medicaid program where the defendant had made a good faith effort to comply with the terms of the
decree. 50 In Duran v. Elrod,5 1 the Seventh Circuit looked to the public safety interest as its basis for vacating a district court decision
denying a request for modification of a consent decree to allow
52
double-bunking in the Cook County Jail.
In 1983, the Second Circuit set forth an influential standard of
46

Jost, supra note 9, at 1148.

47 Schwarzschild, supra note 7, at 901-07.
48 See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (courts should show
deference to prison administrators' decisions regarding the management of prisons because of the lack ofjudicial expertise in prison management and the added administrative burdens on the courts brought on by such efforts).
49 602 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. deniedsub nom. Thornburgh v. Philadelphia Wel-

fare Rights Org., 446 U.S. 1026 (1980).
50 Id. at 1117. The court noted that the goal of 180,000 screenings could not be met
because not enough of the plaintiff class wanted the screenings, despite a good-faith
effort on the part of the Commonwealth to make the services available. The consent
decree entered between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the class of Pennsylvania Medicaid recipients required the Commonwealth, among other things, to implement a statewide outreach program extending the preventative medicine services of
the Medicaid program to eligible recipients with a goal of 180,000 health screenings
each year. Finding that outside factors had frustrated the purpose of the decree, the
court refused to enforce its penalty payment provisions, which would have resulted in "a
windfall to unidentified class members" rather than providing "a financial incentive for
the achievement of outreach goals." Id. at 1121.
51 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985).
52 Id. at 762. The Seventh Circuit noted that the principal reason the district court
turned down the modification request was the court's "belief that the County had created the fix it was in by having failed to enlarge the jail fast enough." Id. The court felt
that punishment was not an adequate reason for refusing modification when balanced
with the public safety interest in having detainees with high recidivism rates remain in
prison. In addition, the court noted that the motivation of enforcing decrees as an example for other defendants in reform cases in the long run will cause the "parties to be
reluctant to sign a consent decree if they will be locked into its terms however the future
may unfold." Id. (citing Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org., 602 F.2d at 1120).
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review for institutional reform cases in New York State Associationfor
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey.53 This case involved a 1975 consent
decree between the patients of an overcrowded mental hospital and
the State of New York, whereby the State was to place the 5,000
patients in homes of no more than ten patients by 1981. 54 In 1980,

the State moved for a modification to allow the patients to be placed
in homes of up to fifty beds to facilitate the emptying of the Willowbrook facility within the time frame set forth by the decree. 5 5 The
Second Circuit recognized that because the defendant was the party
requesting the modification, the case resembled Swift more than
United Shoe Machinery Corp. Nevertheless, the court distinguished the
case from Swift, declaring that the State's modification request was
not "in derogation of the primary objective of the decree, namely to
empty such a mammoth institution as Willowbrook. ."56 Stating
that "any modification will perforce alter some aspect of the decree," the Second Circuit rejected the Armour four-corners approach
to the interpretation of consent decrees in institutional reform
57
cases.
Recently, in two rulings involving school desegregation decrees, the Supreme Court considered the separation of powers
question which arises when courts engage in ongoing management
of public institutions. 58 In Missouri v. Jenkins,59 the Court held that
the district court's call for a property tax increase in violation of
Missouri law "contravened the- principles of comity that must govern the exercise of the district court's equitable discretion in this
area." 60 In Jenkins, the district court entered. a desegregation plan
for the Kansas City Metropolitan School District (KCMSD), which it
estimated would cost $88 million. 6 1 Because of a state law prohibiting the increase of local property taxes, the KCMSD could not raise
the funds locally to pay for the plan. In the face of the state statute,
the district court ordered a tax increase to pay for the plan. 62 Justice
53

706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).

54 Id. at 958-59.

Id. at 960.
Id. at 969.
57 Id. The Second Circuit looked to its own decision in King-Seeley Thermos Co. v.
Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969), to support its premise that "[w]hen a
case involves drawing the line between legitimate interests on each side, modification
will be allowed on a lesser showing [than in Swift]."
58 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v.
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
59 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
55
56

60 Id. at 50.

61 Id. at 38 (citingJenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 43-44 (W.D. Mo. 1985)).
62 Id.
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White, writing for the Court, stated that instead of levying the tax
directly, the district court should have "authorized or required the
KCMSD to levy property taxes at a rate adequate to fund the desegregation remedy and could have enjoined the state laws that would
have prevented the KCMSD from exercising this power."' 63 The key
difference between the district court's and the Supreme Court's approaches is that the Supreme Court placed the responsibility for devising and implementing the remedy in the hands of the local
government rather than in the hands of the courts.64
The second desegregation case, Board of Education of Oklahoma
City Public Schools v. Dowell, 65 involved a request by the plaintiffs to

reopen a thirty-year-old desegregation case as a result of a change in
the busing arrangement originally implemented in the decree. 66 In
1977, the district court concluded that "compliance with the constitutional requirements" had been achieved and terminated its jurisdiction in the case. 67 . In 1984, the school district altered their
busing plan to conform with demographic changes. 68 The Court refused to allow a reopening of the case, noting the need for flexibility
in adopting reform plans over time, the proper role of the local government and citizens in making such decisions regarding their institutions, and the impropriety of courts' indefinite involvement in the
running of institutions, which have complied with constitutional
standards for many years. 69
By the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Rufo, the
grievous wrong standard had ceased to serve as the guiding force in
institutional reform cases. The circuit courts generally allowed in63

Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51.
64 Justice White relied on Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955), and

Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977), for the premise that the
"local authorities have the 'primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing and solving'
the problems of desegregation." Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51-52 (quoting Brown, 349 U.S. at
299).
65 Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
66 Id. The plan approved by the District Court in 1972 required the school system to
bus children in predominately minority areas to predominately white areas to school for
grades K-4, and children from predominately white areas to predominately minority
areas for grades 5-6 with busing patterns in the higher grades to be set as needed to
obtain integration. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 338 F. Supp. 1256,
aft'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
67 Id. at 634 (citing Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., Civ. Action No.
9452 (W.D. Okla., Jan. 18, 1977)).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 636-37. The Court relied on Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717,
742 (1974), when it stated "[s]uch decrees, unlike the one in Swift, are not intended to
operate in perpetuity. Local control over the education of children allows citizens to
participate in decision making, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit
local needs." Id.
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stitutional defendants greater latitude in modifying consent decrees. v0 Yet at the same time, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Armour & Co. 71 and Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 72 was
giving signals that a more contractual view of the consent decree
7
should apply. In school desegregation cases like Missouri v. Jenkins 3
and Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell,74 however, the Supreme Court signaled a turn toward deference to local
authorities in the modification of consent decrees. This deference
only makes sense if the consent decree itself could be modified upon
a lesser showing than that required under the Armour & Co. "four
75
corners" standard.
III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1971, the inmates of the Suffolk County Jail sued the Suffolk
County Sheriff, the Commissioner of Correction of the State of Massachusetts, the Mayor of Boston, and nine City Councilors, charging
that the conditions in the Charles Street Jail, where they were being
held as pretrial detainees, violated their constitutional rights protected by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 76 The Charles
Street Jail was built in 1848 with single cells to hold 180 male detainees. 7 7 A number of problems associated with the age of the jail
existed, including pests and inadequate ventilation, heat, dining and
78
kitchen facilities, fire escapes, hygiene and recreational facilities.
Additionally, the population of the jail had reached 340, necessitating double-bunking in nearly all of the 142 operable cells. 79
In June 1973, the United States District Court found the conditions in the Charles Street Jail to be in violation of the detainees'
constitutional rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amend70 See Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied sub nom. Thornburgh v. Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org., 446 U.S. 1026 (1980);
New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983); and Duran
v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985).
71 402 U.S. 673 (1971).
72 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
73 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
74 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
75 If the Armour standard were applied in Dowell, the terms of the consent decree
could not be altered for the terms themselves represent the bargain of the parties. The
question of how much deference to the give to the local authorities' plan for a change in
the implementation of the decree would be moot.
76 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass.
1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
77 Id. at 679.
78 Id. at 679-80.
79 Id. at 681.
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ment.s0 Taking into account the extreme overcrowding at the jail
and the procrastination of the authorities addressing the problems,
the district court enjoined the defendants from double-bunking inmates at the Charles Street Jail after November 30, 1973, and from
housing any inmates at the Charles StreetJail afterJune 30, 1976.81
In 1977, the problems at the jail remained unresolved and the
county was operating the jail in violation of the original order of the
district court.8 2 The district court then ordered that the jail be
closed; the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, setting a closing date for October 1978.83 The closing was staved off at
the end of September 1978, when the parties submitted a plan that
formed the basis of the consent decree entered by the district court
in May 1979.84 The decree included a plan to build a new jail with
309 single cells, seventy square feet in size.85 While this plan called
for the new jail to be built by 1983, in 1984 the Boston City Council
had not yet approved the funding for the project.8 6 The Sheriff of
Suffolk County then sued the Boston Mayor, the City Council, and
the Commissioner of Correction to get the funds appropriated for
87
the new jail.
By the time the funds were appropriated in the wake of the state
court action, the inadequacy of the 309-cell jail was readily apparent. The inmates, in conjunction with the Sheriff, moved to modify
the terms of the consent decree to allow for a 453-cell facility.88
The district court modified the decree but stipulated that the "single-cell occupancy is maintained under the design for the new facility." 8 9 Construction of the new jail then began in 1987.90
InJuly 1989, during the construction of the new jail, the Sheriff
moved to have the consent decree modified to allow double-bunking in 197 cells, to raise the capacity of the new jail to 610 detainees. 91 As a basis for his request, the Sheriff claimed that the
at 691.
81 Id.
82 Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 755 (1992).
83 Inmates of the Suffolk CountyJail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98, 99 (1st Cir. 1978).
84 Inmates of the Suffolk CountyJail v. Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-G (D. Mass.
Oct. 2, 1978).
85 Id.
86 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 756.
87 Att'y Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361 (Mass. 1985).
88 Inmates of the Suffolk CountyJail v. Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-G (D. Mass.
Apr. 11, 1985).
89 Id.
90 Rufo, 112 S.Ct. at 756.
91 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 562 (D. Mass.
1990).
80 Id.
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continued increase in the inmate population constituted a change in
fact which required a modification of the decree. In addition, the
Sheriff claimed that the decision of the Supreme Court in Bell v.
Wofish, 9 2 which confirmed the constitutionality of double-bunking,
constituted a change in law which would render the application of
93
the consent decree inequitable.
The district court rejected the change in law as a basis for the
modification, claiming that "Bell did not directly overrule any legal
interpretation on which the 1979 consent decree was based." 9 4 The
district court, noting that the Sheriff should have foreseen the increase in the inmate population, also denied the Sheriff's motion
based on a change in fact.9 5 It based this holding on the fact that
the motion did not meet the standard set forth in United States v.
Swift & Co., 96 which required a "clear showing of a grievous wrong

evoked by new and unforeseen conditions." 9 7 Finally, the court also
claimed that even if it applied a more flexible standard, it could not
allow a modification for double-bunking because, "[a] separate cell
for each detainee has always been an important element of the relief
sought in this litigation-perhaps even the most important
98
element."
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, 99 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the lower
courts applied the correct standard review in denying the motion.' 0 0
IV.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

A.

In an opinion written by Justice White, 10 ' the Court vacated the
decision of the district court and remanded the case for reconsideration under the flexible standard set forth in its opinion.' 0 2 Under
this standard, a party seeking a modification of a consent decree in
an institutional reform case need only establish that a "significant
92 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
93 Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 564.
94 Id.

95
96
97
98

Id. at 565.
286 U.S. 106 (1932). See supra text accompanying notes 11-21.
Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 563.
Id. at 565.

99 Inmates of the Suffolk CountyJail v. Kearney, 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990).

100 Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S.Ct. 748, 757 (1992).
101 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice

White's majority opinion. Justice Thomas took no part in the decision or consideration
of the case.
102 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 765.
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change in facts or law warrants a revision of the decree and that the
proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed
10 3
circumstance."
The Court first noted that the district court erred in its assumption that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) codified the
"grievous wrong" standard articulated by Justice Cardozo in
Swift.10 4 Justice White opined that in Swift, the lack of a change in
fact rather than rigid prohibition on the modification of consent decrees prevented the modification of the decree. He noted that Justice Cardozo saw the need for flexibility in decrees where they
10 5
"involve[d] the supervision of changing conduct or conditions."'
Justice White then mentioned that the Court's decisions since Swift
"emphasized a need for flexibility in administering consent
06
decrees."1
Justice White also noted that the special nature of institutional
reform litigation requires that the courts apply a flexible standard
because consent decrees in such cases may involve court supervision
of the institution for a long period of time.' 0 7 Such reform efforts
will often be new to the institution and require modification over
time to help "in achieving the goals of reform litigation."10 8 Justice
White then recognized that consent decrees involving institutional
reform affect not only the parties involved but also the public interest, which may not have a representative voice in the creation of the
decree.' 0 9 Finally, Justice White dismissed the respondent's claim
that increasing the flexibility of consent decrees would decrease the
impetus for reform groups to enter into the decrees. In doing so, he
emphasized that the benefits of avoiding the uncertainty and cost
associated with litigation will continue to serve as an enticement to
enter into consent decrees." 0
After establishing the need for a more flexible standard than
that applied by the district court, Justice White went on to discuss
the application of the flexible standard to the petitioner's request
Id.
Id. at 757.
105 Id. at 758 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932)).
106 Id. Justice White specifically mentions Syst. Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642
(1961) (change in law as basis for modification of consent decree); and Bd. of Educ. of
Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991) (change in fact as basis for closure
of court supervision of consent decree).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 759.
11O Id. at 759-60.
103

104
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for double-bunking at the new jail. 1 1 The Court found that the increase in the number of pretrial detainees did constitute a change in
fact significant enough to warrant a change in the consent decree.' 12
While it allowed that a party should not be able to rely on changes
in circumstances foreseen when they entered into the decree, the
Court rejected the respondent's assertion that "modification should
be allowed only when a change in facts is both 'unforeseen and unforeseeable.' "113 To establish that the increase in the population
was unforeseen, Justice White looked to the projections in the original architectural plan, which predicted a decrease in the number of
pretrial detainees. 114 He also noted that if the current increase
could have been foreseen when the plan was modified in 1985, both
parties would not have "settled for a new jail that would not have
been adequate to house pretrial detainees." 1 15
The Court then put forward two arguments dismissing the district court's finding that single-celling was the primary purpose of
the decree. 1 6 First, the Court found that "the decree itself nowhere
expressly orders or reflects an agreement by petitioners to provide
jail facilities having single cells sufficient to accommodate all future
pretrial detainees, however large the number of such detainees
might be." 1 17 Then the Court went beyond the text of the decree,
declaring that the proper inquiry is not whether the decree is an
undertaking to provide single cells, but rather whether the modified
decree continues to provide an adequate remedy for the problems
that precipitated its creation.1 8
9
The Court rejected the petitioner's claim that Bell v. Wofish 1"
constituted a change in law sufficient to allow for a modification of
the consent decree. 120 An example of a change in law that would
allow for a modification of a consent decree is one in which a decree
was entered to prohibit an illegal act but, after a change in law, the
acts under the decree themselves were outside the spirit of the
law.121 In Bell, the affirmation of the constitutionality of double111 Id. at 761.
112 Id.

113 Id. at 760 (quoting Respondents' Brief at 35, Rufo (Nos. 90-954; 90-1004)).
114 Id. at 761 (the original consent decree included inmate population projections of
232 from 1985-89, 226 from 1990-94, and 216 from 1995-99).
115 Id. at 761.
116 Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk CountyJail, 734 F. Supp. 561, 565 (D. Mass. 1990).
117 Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk CountyJail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 755, 761 (1992).
118 Id. at 762.

119 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
120 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.
121 Id. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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bunking "did not cast doubt on the legality of single celling."' 122
The Court noted that allowing changes in consent decrees based on
a decrease in constitutional standards "would necessarily imply that
the only legally enforceable obligation assumed by the state under
the consent decree was that of ultimately achieving minimal constitutional... prison standards."' 123 By limiting the ability of a party
to base a request for a modification of consent decrees on a change
in the law, the Court sought to uphold the "finality of agreements"
124
and promote negotiation of settlements.
The Court then turned its attention to the standards involved in
deciding "whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to
the changed circumstance."' 25 Justice White began his discussion
by stating that a proposed modification must not "create or perpetuate a constitutional violation" and that a "proposed modification
should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to
the constitutional floor."' 12 6 The Court then limited the discretion
of courts considering modification requests to a review of whether
the proposed change will rectify the problem it seeks to solve. 127 By
limiting the role of courts in modifying decrees, the Court intended
to place the responsibility for plan administration in the hands of
those who have the experience of running the institution and implementing the reforms.' 28 Finally, the Court emphasized that, to the
extent they do not create or perpetuate constitutional violations, fiscal constraints are relevant concerns in institutional reform cases
and courts should keep them in mind when reviewing proposed
29
changes.'
B.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRING OPINION

Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's judgment to vacate
the lower court decision and remand for reconsideration. She wrote
her own opinion, however, "to emphasize the limited nature of our
review; to clarify why, despite our limited review, the case should be
returned to the district court; and to explain [her] concerns with
certain portions of the Court's opinion."' 130 Justice O'Connor began her concurrence by noting that appellate courts should apply an
122 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.
123 Id. at 763 (quoting Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir. 1991)).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 763-64.

127
128
129
130

Id. at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 765 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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abuse of discretion standard when reviewing consent decree modification decisions. 13' She stated that appellate courts should "examine primarily the method in which the district court exercises its
discretion, not the substantive outcome the district court
reaches."' 13 2 Justice O'Connor's standard of review requires only
that a district court judge "take into account the relevant considerations . . . and accommodate them in a reasonable way."' 33 She
noted that in institutional reform cases, the judges have often been
supervising the reform process for a number of years and therefore
are in a better position to understand the problem.' 3 4
In her review of the district court's decision, Justice O'Connor
noted three errors of law. First, the district court relied on the Swift
foreseeability standard to dismiss the modification request.' 35 She
observed that even if a problem is foreseeable, "modification could
conceivably still be 'equitable.' -136 Second, the district court failed
to take into account the petitioner's fiscal problems in its determination of what was equitable. 1 37 Justice O'Connor explained that excessive costs of reform could lead to an inequitable situation if they
infringed on competing government interests. 3 8 Finally, she noted
the cyclical reasoning in the district court's assertion that because
the proposed modifications would set aside obligations of the decree, the modifications could not comply with the purpose of the
39
decree. 1
After pointing out the flaws in the district court's review, Justice
O'Connor nonetheless recognized that if these errors were cured on
remand and the substantive result were the same, such a result
would be perfectly within the district court's discretion.' 40 She then
proceeded to criticize the majority opinion. First, Justice O'Connor
attacked Justice White's statement that, "[i]f modification of one
term of a consent decree defeats the purpose of the [consent] decree, obviously modification would be all but impossible."' 14 1 She
noted that some elements of a decree could exist that are so important that any modification would defeat the purpose of the decree,
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 766 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 767 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131
132
133
134
135
136
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while other elements could exist that would be open for change.14 2
To suggest that a court oversteps its authority if it finds some elements of a consent decree too central to be changed is "an unwarranted and ill-advised" limit on its discretion, according to Justice
3
O'Connor.14
Justice O'Connor then criticized what she saw as the majority's
call for the district courts to "defer to local government administrators ... to resolve the intricacies of implementing a decree modification." 144 She argued that deferring to one of the parties in the suit
is not equitable, and judges should decide what is equitable.
C.

JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Stevens, 14 5 in his dissenting opinion, agreed with the
standard for modifying consent decrees articulated by the majority,
but stated that under this standard, the district court's findings must
be upheld. 146 A determination that the district court was correct in
finding that the respondent could foresee the increases in the pretrial detainee population when it modified the decree in 1985 lies at
the heart of Justice Stevens' argument. 147 The dissent noted that
given the marked increase in the detainee population, which caused
the 1985 modification and the nature of our society at this time, an
increase in detainee population in the future, if not then foreseen,
was reasonably foreseeable.' 48 He also dismissed the petitioners'
claim based on a change in law to allow double-bunking, noting that
the legality of double-bunking was known to both parties in 1985
when the consent decree was modified and that the petitioners did
not request double-bunking atthat time. 14 9
In addition to the foreseeability of the detainee population increase, Justice Stevens cited a number of concerns which should influence the Court when deciding the equity of the proposed
modification. Justice Stevens first mentioned the petitioners' history of non-compliance with the injunctions in 1973 and the consent
decree since 1979.150 According to Justice Stevens, not only did
these failures cast doubt on the motives of the petitioners in moving
for a modification, but they also represented hardships endured by
142 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).

144 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145 Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion.
146 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 768 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 769 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

148 Id. at 771-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 771 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

150 Id. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the respondents in exchange for the gains they thought they were
going to receive under the consent decree. 15 1 Second, he argued
that claims of fiscal restraint should not be allowed in this case because they represented a continued lack of fortitude on the part of
government officials to come up with the funds needed to rectify the
problems, rather than a severe infringement on the pubic interest.1 52 Third, Justice Stevens claimed that "to the extent litigants
are allowed to avoid their solemn commitments, the motivation for
particular settlements will be compromised." 15 3 Finally, he agreed
with the district court's assessment of single-celling as the central
purpose of the litigation, and thus found that any alteration of that
15 4
term would defeat the decree's purpose.
V.

ANALYSIS

In Rufo, the Court faced the challenge of striking a balance between two competing views of the consent decree. On one hand,
the consent decree can be seen as a remedial measure designed to
alter the future behavior of a public institution so as to prevent its
infringement upon the private rights of the plaintiff class. 15 5 Under
this view, the parties to a consent decree can be seen as working
together to create a solution to the inadequacies of the institution.
The prospective nature of this remedy requires the consent decree
to be applied with enough flexibility to allow the institution to adapt
to unforeseen changes.
On the other hand, the consent decree can be seen as a contract
between the two adversarial parties in which the plaintiff class gives
up their right to pursue their case in return for the promise by the
56
defendant institution to undertake specific agreed-upon actions.'
Under this view, protecting the sanctity ofjudgments under consent
151 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 The view of the consent decree as an attempt to provide a plan for the reformation
of the institutional operations shall be referred to in this Note as the remedial model.
This description of the consent decree in public law cases has been set forth by Maimon
Schwarzschild, supra note 7, at 907. Schwarzschild draws a distinction between public
law cases, in which the remedy is "heavily influenced by legislative facts," and private
law cases, which tend to be more adversarial in nature. Id. The consent decree in a
public law case presents a "double anomaly" because not only is the legislative branch

left out of the decisionmaking process, but the parties themselves also prevent the court
from providing its expertise as a finder of fact and law. Id.
156 This view of the consent decree shall be referred to in this note as the contractual
model. Justice Marshall advocated this view in United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S.
673 (1971). See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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decree is necessary to preserve consent decrees as a viable tool for
settling cases involving the government.
If viewed as more of a remedial than a contractual measure, the
consent decree brings up the further question of separation of powers. 15 7 For a consent decree to remain flexible enough to adapt to
changes in fact or law, a court must maintain the equitable discretion to alter the terms of the decree. The power of equity carries
with it the danger that the court will remain unaccountable to democratic pressures. 158 Without a check on this power, there exists a
potential for abuse by overly active judges and error by inadequately
informed courts.
This Note argues that the Rufo Court properly recognized the
need for flexibility as paramount in institutional reform cases. Furthermore, the flexible standard of review set forth by the Court
maintains safeguards for plaintiffs that adequately prohibit the government defendants from shirking their consent decree duties. Finally, the Court properly removed the district courts from the
business of devising reform plans and limited them to the roles of
reviewing plans for constitutionality and enforcing decrees.
A.

SHOULD THE CONSENT DECREE BE MODIFIED?

In Inmates of the Suffolk CountyJailv. Rufo, the Supreme Court set
forth a two-part test for courts to apply when entertaining requests
for the modification of decrees. 159 The first part of the test requires
that "a party seeking modification of a consent decree ...establish
that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree." 16 0 The language of this threshold test suggests a more lenient standard than the traditional Swift standard with its
requirements for a "clear showing of a grievous wrong."' 16 1 In rejecting the "grievous wrong" standard, the Court recognized that
the consent decree in an institutional reform case resembles the remedial model more than the contractual model. In fact, the dissent
did not seem to lament the passing of the contractual Swift standard
either. 162 The explanation for the unanimous abandonment of Swift
157 In the case where the institution being reformed is under state or local control and
a federal court is administering the consent decree, federalism concerns also arise as
federal institutions take a role in the management of state entities. For the purposes of
this Note, only the separation of powers issues will be addressed.
158 For a summary of the problems traditionally associated with equitable remedies,
see PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAw'S CONSCIENCE 17-20 (1990).
159 Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 764-65 (1992).
160 Id.
161 See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
162 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 768. In his dissent, Justice Stevens also endorses the flexible
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may lie in the fact that in Swift, Justice Cardozo himself recognized
the difference between contractual and remedial consent decrees
when he distinguished "between restraints that give protection to
rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision
of changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative." 163 Following the United Shoe Machinery Corp. 164 view of Swift,
the Court interpreted Swift as a case where no significant change
occurred in original conditions that the decree was implemented to
remedy. 165 If the Rufo test was applied to the facts in Swift, modification would still have been denied because the defendants failed to
show a significant change in fact, which would require modification
of the decree.
While the flexible standard put forth in Rufo can be harmonized
with the language in Swift, on its face the Rufo standard seems incompatible with the contractual "four corners" rule put forth by the
Court in United States v. Armour & Co. 16 6 and Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts. 1 67 The four-corners rule assumes an adversarial
model in which the decree has no single general purpose but is
rather a convergence of the competing purposes of the parties. 168
The Court's statement in Rufo that the "purpose [of the decree] was
to provide a remedy for what had been found, based on a variety of
factors, including double celling, to be unconstitutional conditions
obtaining in the Charles StreetJail"' 16 9 suggests a model of cooperation between the two parties seeking a remedy for constitutional deficiencies. The terms of the decree, therefore, serve as a means for
reaching this common end, rather than as the end in and of itself.
Like Swift, however, Armour can also be limited to its facts. In
Armour, the age of the decree that the government sought to modify
standard set forth in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
163 Swift, 286 U.S. at 114-15.
164 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
165 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762. See also Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208, 211-12 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 897 (1988) (in allowing for double-bunking where South Carolina board
of corrections was faced with unanticipated increase in prison population, the Plyler
court stated: "[wie agree that the general teaching of Swift & Co. 'is merely that harm
and continuing need must always be weighed in the balance in deciding whether continued enforcement of any injunctive decree is equitable in the light of specific changed
circumstances'" (quoting Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 645 F.2d 239, 245 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 106 (1981)).
166 402 U.S. 673 (1971).
167 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
168 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
169 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.
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pointed to the inappropriateness of the modification as much as did
the terms of the decree itself.17 0 If the consent decree in Armour was
viewed from a remedial, rather than a contractual standpoint, the
intended remedy of the decree would be to prevent Armour & Co.
from exercising monopoly power in the food industry.- Given the
vast changes in the industry over fifty-one years, the purchase of Armour by Greyhound did not pose the anti-competitive threat that
the decree originally sought to prevent.
Like the Swift standard before it, the Court enunciated the fourcorners rule in an antitrust case. In antitrust litigation, the parties
often enter into a negative injunction which prohibits the defendant
from continuing a harmful activity. The nature of the remedy ensures an adversarial relationship between the parties to the consent
decree because the defendant has little to gain by limiting their own
freedom of action. Thus, Justice Marshall's view of the parties as
adversaries entering into a contractual relationship is justified in the
context of the private party defendant. Where the defendant is a
government institution, however, the lines between the parties become blurred. Authorities in charge of the institutions have a motivation to gain additional funds and power for themselves and their
departments. This could lead to a collusion between the parties to
the decree-at the expense of the interests of the general public and
third parties who would be affected by the decree.1 71 Therefore, the
terms of the consent decree would represent only the common purposes of two parties with interests outside those obtainable through
litigation. 172
Even if the parties to the institutional reform decree remain adversarial, the decree, because it modifies the operation of a public
institution, will affect the rights of unrepresented third parties. The
Court correctly recognized this fact when it stated, "[tihe public interest is a particularly significant reason for applying a flexible standard in institutional reform litigation because such decrees reach
beyond the parties involved directly in the suit and impact on the
170 Armour, 402 U.S. at 675.
171 See Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Federal Courts must be
wary of entanglement in the intramural struggles of state or local government."). See also
Donald L. Horowitz, DecreeingOrganizationalChange:JudicialSupervision of Public Institutions,
1983 DUKE LJ. 1265, 1294; Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent
Decrees to Insulate Policiesfrom Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295.
172 For a discussion of interests of third parties in consent decrees, see Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 103; Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 321 (1988).
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public's right to sound and efficient operation of its institutions."1 7 3
Some of the third party interests noted by the Court in Rufo include:
the interest of detainees at other institutions, who would experience
double-bunking as a result of the prohibition of double-bunking at
the Suffolk County Jail; the interests of beneficiaries of the work of
other public institutions, which will be effected by a reduction in
their percentage share of limited government funds; the public
safety interest underlying the incarceration of the accused prior to
trial; and the interest of taxpayers, who could be forced to pay
higher taxes. 174 While it is true that United Shoe Machinery Corp. requires the fulfillment of the decree's purposes prior to any modification of the decree in favor of the defendants, the purposes of the
decree must include the interests of third parties, which will not
1 75
likely be covered in the terms of the decree itself.
Although the Court applied the four corners analysis to deny
the modification of a consent decree in an institutional reform setting in FirefightersLocal Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 176 the Court noted
that the modification would violate the rights of innocent third parties. 177 In Stotts, the Court used the four-corners rule to reject the
premise that an affirmative action plan should take precedence over
a seniority plan where no language in the affirmative action consent
decree suggested such a hierarchy. 178 In Stotts, as in Rufo, a change
in fact unforeseen at the inception of the consent decree required
the court to take into account third-party interests to change the
79
application of the remedial plan. 1
While both the district court and Justice Stevens' dissent claim
to apply the same flexible standard as the majority, they focus only
on the effects of a change in circumstances on the parties to the
decree, rather than the effects of the change on third parties. For
example, the district court found that the inmates had accepted
years of unconstitutional conditions under the consent decree in re173 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 759 (quoting Heath v. DeCourcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir.
1989)).

174 Id.

175 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968).
176 467 U.S. 561, 574 (1984).
177 Id. at 575.

178 Id. at 574.
179 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals because a
change in fact (a decrease in funds available for the Memphis fire department) created a
situation in which protecting the racial quotas set forth in the consent decree would lead
to an infringement on the rights of white firefighters under the city's seniority plan. The
four-corners rule of interpretation is used to justify limiting the scope of the consent
decree so as to take into account the interest of the third parties. Id.
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turn for the promise of single-ceiling granted by the sheriff.1 80 The
years of hardship serve as consideration for the benefits of singlecelling. 18 1 According to the district court, this perseverance indicates that single-ceiling is a central element of the decree.1 8 2 Yet
under the district court's analysis, because the interests of third parties are not set forth explicitly in the negotiating process, they do
not form any part of the contractual relationship between the jail
and the inmates.
Justice Stevens' standard, while nominally more flexible than
the district court's, 18 3 remains bound to a contractual view of the
consent decree. The dissent, like the district court, found singlecelling to be the central purpose of the decree. Justice Stevens
stated, "[a] prohibition against double celling was a central purpose
of the relief ordered by the district court in 1973, of the bargain
negotiated in 1979 and embodied in the original consent decree,
and in the order entered in 1985 that the petitioners now seek to
modify."' 184 If, though, the fact that several drafts of a decree contain the same term was enough to make that term a central purpose
of the decree, then any provision in the decree over several drafts,
such as the amount of recreational space or the color of the paint,
would be considered central to the decree. The majority opinion
correctly recognized this fact when it stated, "[i]f modification of
one term of a consent decree defeats the purpose of the decree, obviously modification would be all but impossible."' 18 5 Instead, if the
flexible standard was truly applied, no term in and of itself would
stand as an embodiment of the purpose of the decree, since the purpose of the decree would simply be the formation of a remedy.
An application of the dissent's standard to the facts of two cases
illustrates its inflexibility. The dissent's standard would allow for
modification in PhiladelphiaWelfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 18 6 in which a
change in fact (not enough members of the plaintiff class were willing to take advantage of the free screenings) made the implementation of a term of the consent decree impossible. But this
180 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 565 (D. Mass.
1990).
181 Id.

182 Id.
183 Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk CountyJail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 772 (1992) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting) ("It is certainly true that when exercising their equitable powers courts
should properly consider the interests of the 'public.' ").
184 Id. at 772.
185 Id. at 762.
186 602 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Thornburgh v. Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org., 446 U.S. 1026 (1980). See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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impossibility of performance exception is not truly a flexible standard but rather a contract doctrine. While the dissent claimed to
adapt the New York State Associationfor Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey
standard, if the Second Circuit analyzed the consent decree in that
case in the same manner as Justice Stevens analyzed the terms of the
consent decree in Rufo, it is unlikely that the change in the decree
ordered by Judge Friendly would have taken place.1 8 7
The belief that if the sanctity of the judgment is not upheld, the
consent decree will cease to provide an effective means of dispute
resolution underlies the dissent's support of a contractual interpretation of consent decrees.' 8 8 As the majority opinion pointed out,
however, the dissent's apprehension is misplaced. 8 9 With regard to
the plaintiff's incentives to enter into consent decrees that may be
modified, the Court noted that the incentives of avoiding the costs
and uncertainties of litigation and taking a more active role in the
design of the remedial plan will exist regardless of the ability of the
government to request modification.' 9 0 The Court properly emphasized keeping the government involved in entering into consent decrees. If courts rigidly hold parties to the terms in the consent
decree, the government will not likely enter into the decrees, except
in those cases where individual administrators see an opportunity to
reap personal benefit at the expense of the general public. This will
lead to higher litigation costs for the taxpayers and the plaintiffs, as
well as higher demands on the limited resources available to the
courts. 9 1t These increased costs may impair the ability of injured
plaintiff classes to bring reform litigation, as they will generally have
fewer resources than the government with which to assert their
19 2
rights.
While the majority opinion correctly recognized the need for
courts to look beyond the terms of the consent decree, it went too
187 In New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983), the consent decree contained provisions requiring
the State of New York to remove mental patients from an overcrowded facility and place
them in intimate groupings. Because the State could not establish homes for all of the
patients by the deadline in the decree, it requested a modification to allow for placement
in larger groupings than those allowed under the terms of the agreement. If Justice
Stevens' rationale in Rufo were applied to these facts, then the purpose of the New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey consent decree would be to provide intimate
placements for the mental patients, no matter what the cost to the taxpayer.
188 Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk CountyJail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 772 (1992) (Stevens,J.,
dissenting).
189 Id. at 759.

190 Id.

191 See McConnell, supra note 171, at 307.
192 See Kramer, supra note 172, at 322.
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far when it stated, "if modification of one term of a consent decree
defeats the purpose of a consent decree, obviously modification
would be all but impossible."' 9 3 As Justice O'Connor noted in her
concurring opinion, "[t]he modification of one term of a decree
does not always defeat the purpose of the decree. But it hardly follows that the modification of a single term can never defeat the decree's purpose."' 194 Justice White's statement regarding the effects
of a one-term change, if applied literally and standing alone, could
allow the modification of decrees so as to completely contradict the
purpose of the decree by placing a negative modifier in front of a
key provision. 195

Justice O'Connor's criticism of Justice White's statement conforms with her belief that the majority's guidelines infringe upon
the equitable discretion of the Court. 196 She not only questioned
the Court's attempt to set guidelines for lower courts exerting equitable powers, but also whether such an endeavor can even be accomplished.' 9 7 This criticism fails to recognize that the Court did
not attempt to place a limit on the district courts' discretion to decide whether or not a change in fact or law warrants modification.
Rather, the Court, by de-emphasizing the importance of the language of the consent decree, attempted to focus the district courts'
attention on the remedial rather than the contractual nature of the
institutional reform consent decree.
The Court outlined two safeguards which attempt to uphold the
integrity of the consent decree. First, the Court stated that any
change in fact or law should be unforeseen at the time the parties
enter into the consent decree.' 9 8 The requirement that changes be
unforeseen prevents defendants from using foreseeable changes in
fact or law to escape their responsibilities under a consent de193 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.

Id. at 767 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
195 It is possible to think of a modification of one term of the consent decree that
would contradict the entire purpose of the decree. For example, in Rufo, if there were a
change in fact which allowed for a change in a consent decree, the plaintiff could request
that the word "no" be added in front of single-ceiling to provide that double-celling be
mandatory. So long as the double-celling did not violate constitutional limits, the modification would be allowed to stand.
196 Id. at 765 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197 Id. Justice O'Connor wrote:
The Court devotes much of its attention to elaborating a "standard" for lower
courts to apply in cases of this kind. I am not certain that the product of this effort"A party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden by
showing either a significant change in factual conditions or in law"-makes matters
any clearer than the equally general language of Rule 60(b) (5). (citations omitted).
198 Id. at 760.
194
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cree. 19 9 The Court applied this limitation to reject the petitioner's
argument that the Supreme Court decision in Bell v. Wofish 2o0 constituted a change in law which should allow the modification of the
consent decree, observing that the parties could foresee the basis
for that .judgment prior to the entry of the original consent
20
decree. '
The Court somewhat weakened the foreseeability provision,
however, in its review of the 1985 modification of the consent decree. In reply to the dissent's argument that the increases in the
inmate population that led to the 1985 modification made further
increases foreseeable, Justice White argued that the Sheriff's approval of the 1985 modification indicated the failure to foresee the
continued growth in the inmate population. 20 2 The logical problem
with these arguments is that each attempts to infer the knowledge
level of the defendant before the agreement from the defendant's
actions after the agreement. If the Court's rationale is carried to its
logical conclusion, knowledge of a change in circumstances could
never be imputed to a defendant at the time of the creation of an
inadequate consent decree. The Court, therefore, has effectively
emasculated the protection of the requirement that changes be
unforeseen.
The ability of both the majority and dissent to use foreseeability
as a crutch for their positions illustrates a reason behind Justice
O'Connor's choice to write a separate concurrence. 20 3 If the Court
applied a limited standard review, the question of what is foreseeable at the time of the entrance of the decree would be left to the
discretion of the district court, which is better informed of the parties' knowledge as of the date of the consent decree. Of course,
only the parties themselves truly know their intentions. The majority opinion may, therefore, prompt the parties' to clarify their true
intentions within the decree so as to reduce the risk involved when
courts attempt to peer into the minds of the parties.
The statement that a "proposed modification should not strive
to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional
199 Id.
200 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding the constitutionality of double-bunking inmates).
201 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 763 (citing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.

424, 437-38 (1976) and Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 428-29 (4th Cir. 1981)). The
Court notes that if the moving party can prove that the consent decree was based on a
misunderstanding of the applicable law, this would satisfy the unforeseeability standard.

Id.
202 Id. at 761.
203 Id. at 765 (O'Connor,J., concurring) ("I write separately ...to clarify why, despite
our limited review, the cases should be returned to the District Court.").
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floor," 20 4 provides a second safeguard against wholesale modification of the terms of consent decrees. Under this element of the
standard of review, institutional defendants must propose modifications which respond to the changed circumstances underlying their
request, and not just use those changed circumstances as an excuse
to rewrite the consent decree in their favor. Yet, given the wide discretion of courts sitting in equity, Justice White's statement in and
of itself offers little protection against lower courts allowing arbitrary and excessive lowering of decree requirements. 20 5 But the
statement does place the lower courts on notice that they must reject an argument for a revision of a consent decree based on the
allegation that it exceeds a lowered constitutional standard.
B.

HOW SHOULD THE CONSENT DECREE BE MODIFIED?

If a party moving for a.modification satisfies its initial burden of
showing that a change in fact or law warrants a revision of the decree then, under the second half of the Rufo test, the reviewing court
should only inquire as to suitability of the proposed modification
given the changed circumstances. 20 6 This standard significantly restricts the role of the district courts in devising and overseeing the
implementation of consent decrees in institutional reform cases.
This limitation is proper when considered in light of the principle of
separation of powers, the special nature of institutional reform litigation, and the general need to reduce the burdens on the federal
court system.
This second half of the Court's standard of review is consistent
with Supreme Court decisions involving institutional reform injunctions, stretching back to Brown v. Board of Education.20 7 The Court,
quoting its decision in Brown, stated, "'[c]onsiderations based on
the allocation of powers within our federal system' require that the
district court defer to local government administrators who have the
'primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing and solving' the
problems of institutional reform, to resolve the intricacies of implementing a decree modification." 20 8 The Court also cited Missouri v.
Jenkins, in which the principles of federalism were invoked to pre204 Id. at 764.
205 But see HOFFER, supra note 158, at 18. While equitable discretion is greater than

that normally exercised by a court, the decisions of higher courts guide lower courts in
exercising their discretion.
206 Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S.Ct. 748, 764 (1992).
207 349 U.S. 294 (1954). See also Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Sch. v. Dowell, 111 S.Ct.
630 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267
(1977).
208 Rufo, 112 S.Ct. at 764 (quoting Brown, 349 U.S. at 299).
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vent the courts from enacting an affirmative injunction requiring a
tax levy. 20 9 Both Brown and Jenkins rest on the idea that under the
separation of powers in our federal system, the executive and legislative branches of government have greater practical knowledge of
how to run public institutions. In addition, these two decisions recognize that the executive and legislative branches of government are
more attuned to the needs of the public due to the democratic nature of their organization.
The circumstances in Rufo present a slightly different problem
for the Court than those before it in Brown and Jenkins. In Brown, the
Court ordered the remedial action on the part of the local authorities, but it left it to the local school board to implement the plan. 210
In Jenkins, the Court was faced with a bare assertion of legislative
power on the part of the district court. 2 1 1 Alternatively, the case
before the Court in Rufo involved a consent decree between two
parties, not an injunction as in Brown or Jenkins. Justice O'Connor
noted that because the consent decree involves an agreement between two parties, the proper role for the court is to hammer out a
' ' 2 12
modification that is "equitable to all concerned.
Justice O'Connor incorrectly drew a distinction between Rufo
andJenkins and Brown based on whether. the judgment occurred due
to an injunction by the court or a consent decree between the parties. Once rendered inapplicable, a term in the original consent decree falls out and must be replaced. At this stage, the parties to the
consent decree reassume their original bargaining positions and are
free to negotiate a new term themselves or leave it up to the court.
The plaintiff class has the same incentives and abilities to negotiate
the modification as they do the original consent decree. 21 3 In fact,
the plaintiff class occupies a stronger bargaining position with respect to the modification because the burden of proving the necessity of the modification lies with the defendant, whereas the initial
burden of proving the need for reform lies with the plaintiff. The
new provision, if not negotiated, resembles an injunction by the
court, not a consent decree. Thus, the deference to the local authorities called for in Brown and Jenkins should apply.
Justice O'Connor's criticism of the standard also failed to take
209 Id. (citingJenkins, 495 U.S. at 51).
210 Brown, 349 U.S. at 294.
211 Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 41-42 (district court levied tax to pay for desegregation plan).
212 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 767 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213 For an analysis of the economic model of settlement in the consent decree context,
see Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in ConsentJudgments, 1987 U. CHi. LEGAL F.
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into account the amount of discretion the second part of the majority's test left in the hands of courts. Under the standard set forth by
Justice White, the reviewing court retains the power to reject any
proposed modification that is ill-suited to remedy the problems at
hand or is overreaching.2 14 This power will prevent abuses on the
part of the local authorities, while at the same time reducing the role
courts play in devising decrees.
The Court also relied on Boardof Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell 2 15 to support the idea that federal courts should
defer to the local government administrators to "resolve the intricacies of implementing a decree modification." 2 16 In Dowell, the defendant's good-faith compliance with the district court's decrees
justified the Court's reliance on the defendant's continued good behavior in the absence of the decree. 2 17 As noted in the Rufo opinion
by both Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens, however, the Sheriff
of Suffolk County did not have a history of good-faith compliance.
Justice O'Connor echoed the fox guarding the hen house parable
when she stated, "[d]eference to one of the parties to a lawsuit is
usually not the surest path to equity; deference to these particular
petitioners, who do not have a model record of compliance with
previous court orders ... is particularly unlikely to lead to an equita2 18
ble result."
Justices O'Connor and Stevens overstated the danger of the defendant taking advantage of the modification of the decree to continue its history of noncompliance. In Rufo, the fact that
construction had begun on the new jail insured the defendants'
compliance with its promise to build a new facility, lest it waste its
investment. In Dowell, the Court's decision not to reopen the case
was not a reward for good-faith compliance with the decree, but
rather was based on the low probability of the defendant undertaking discriminatory practices after years of good-faith compliance
with the decree.2 19 To refuse to defer to the judgment of the local
officials in a case where they have previously failed to comply with
the decree's provisions serves only to punish if the facts, as in Rufo,
suggest that the local officials have begun to comply. 2 20 Whether or
not a refusal to modify a decree serves to punish or to uphold the
214 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 764.
215 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
216 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 764.
217 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 630. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
218 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 767.
219 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
220 See Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 762 (7th Cir. 1985) (punishment as a reason for
refusing to modify consent decree unjustified because of the effects of the decree on
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basic purpose of the decree can be determined by asking if the modification would still be necessary had the defendant complied with
the decree. If so, then the refusal of modification serves only to
punish, a task better achieved through court sanctions against the
offending administrators than the imposition of an inefficient consent decree upon the public institution.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Justice White's majority opinion properly recognized that government institutions are not self-contained and determinative entities. The needs of the general public limit the discretion of
individual public institutions and, as such, must be taken into account when making decisions that affect the operation of those institutions. By defining the purpose of consent decrees as a general
reformation of constitutional violations at an institution, the Court
recognizes the dangers involved when individuals, acting on behalf
of the government, bind the discretion of future democratically
elected officials. In further deference to these democratic ideals,
the second half of the standard put forth by the Rufo Court ensures
that control over public institutions remains in the hands of the public, rather than the federal courts. The dissent's suggestion that the
standard adopted by the Court destroys the usefulness of the consent decree by allowing public institutions to avoid their responsibilities under such decrees fails to recognize the need to provide
incentives for the institutional defendant to come to the bargaining
table. The Court's standard should increase the likelihood of consent decrees as government defendants will feel more at ease engaging plaintiffs in a dialogue aimed at reforming the institution.
Finally, removing the courts from their role in developing reform
programs will reduce the pressure on the courts' congested dockets.
In the end, the Rufo decision properly leaves institutional administrators with the task of running institutions and the courts with the
task of protecting constitutional and statutory rights.
MICHAEL J. FIEWEGER

non-parties and the disincentive to future defendants to enter into inflexible consent
decrees).

